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1 Introduction
The rationale behind the granting of aid to developing countries is complex. Strategic,
humanitarian, human rights and developmental goals enter into this matrix of
motivation. Different donors (multilateral and bilateral) have diverse and even
competing reasons for giving aid. Consequently the aid effectiveness literature is
voluminous. It can range from the contribution of aid to growth (Burnside and Dollar
2000 is one example) to the rent seeking aspects of aid (Svensson 2000 for instance).
This paper analyses two other aspects of aid conditionality. First, how best the
conditionality behind foreign aid, sometimes non-economic, is complied with in a
principal-agent framework. The principal-agent framework is important when the donor
wants a specific task to be undertaken as a quid pro quo of aid. Second, understanding
the domestic political processes, involving interaction between policy makers and
domestic special interest groups, that often underlies policy formation; so that outside
donors are at least aware of the mechanics of policymaking, and can ultimately
influence it. This analysis implies endogenous policy formation, which is important to
donors wishing to influence and alter the recipient’s policies. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows: section 2 examines the first issue, section 3 deals with the second
process and section 4 contains a summary.
2 Conditionality in non-economic objectives
There is a growing incidence of aid targeted at objectives that are strictly not economic,
such as improved human rights, environmental protection and disarmament.1 Although
I speak of the non-economic objectives of aid, the analysis of this section is equally
applicable to other examples: debt-relief for social protection as well as aid programmes
geared to post-conflict societies or greater market orientation. The granting of monies
for these purposes entails an effort by the recipient in carrying out this task, akin to the
agent in a principal-agent model. In this section, the aid donor can be viewed as the
principal and the recipient as the agent, in a principal-agent relationship.
Where the effort by the agent is unobservable or unverifiable, there is the standard
problem of moral hazard. These difficulties can be further exacerbated when there are
many principals or donors dealing with the same agent or government (the common
agency problem). An additional problem can arise when the agent carries out multiple
tasks. The essence of any principal-agent relationship is unverifiable effort exerted by
the agent in carrying out the task for the principal. There is, however, a verifiable
output. One cannot usually prove effort levels undertaken by those who act on our
behalf, but the outcome or output is verifiable. The presence of a multiple-task agent, as
demonstrated by Holmström and Milgrom (1991), in general yields low-powered
incentives to perform any one task, when the various activities of the agent are
substitutes as far as the principal’s interests are concerned. It might even pay the
1 Of course these may improve economic performance and raise the quality of life. Traditionally,
however, lending was mainly related to the economic efficiency (returns) of projects. See Hopkins
(2000) on political economy aspects of aid.2
principal to forbid one or more activities that negatively impact on the principal’s
objectives. The Holmström and Milgrom (1991) model considers a situation where a
single principal deals with an agent carrying out multiple functions.
Wilson (1989) characterizes a typical government bureaucracy as answering to many
masters and stakeholders, as well as carrying out several functions simultaneously.
There are many instances where several principals (aid donors) deal with an agent
(government) carrying out several tasks. For example, one donor may be making
payments for improvements in labour standards or a privatization programme, while
another is more concerned with disarmament or the reduction of corruption. They could
all be interacting with a single government who has, as a consequence, several jobs.
Following the set-up in Dixit (1999) we specify a multiple principal, multi-task
f r a m e w o r k .L e tt h et w ot a s k st ob ed o n eb ed e n o t e db yx1 and x2 corresponding to
commissions made by Principal 1 and 2 respectively. Each job entails symmetric costly
and unpleasant effort levels, e. We abstract from uncertain variations in the agent’s
efforts (the influence of luck or simply better organized effort), and the fact that she/he
might want to undertake some of the tasks for its own sake (Tirole 1994).
Principal 1 derives a benefit = B for task 1 but none from job 2, and the same in reverse
applies to principal 2. Both principals will need to satisfy the participation constraint of
the agent. The first principal’s profit function takes the following form:
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The terms inside the square brackets indicate the costs of exerting effort by the agent,
which the principal must meet in order to satisfy the agent’s participation constraint.
Observe the jointness of effort, because the agent must simultaneously carry out both
tasks x1 and x2. The payment made to the agent is indicated by w, and the payment
schedule is linear. The last term refers to how carrying out one task affects effort levels
in the other. If k is positive then the two tasks are substitutes: more effort in one
direction implies less effort elsewhere. If k is negative the two jobs are complements.
The second principal’s profit function by symmetry is:
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Maximization of (1) with respect to x1 will lead to:
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where, x1 = x2= x by symmetry. An identical expression can also be obtained for
Principal 2. Rearrangement in terms of w yields the following payment schedule:






(a) The outcome in (4) is in a situation when effort is unverifiable, but ‘output’ can
be observed. Incentive payments to the agent decline (or are less high-powered)
if the two tasks conducted by the agent are substitutes, as efforts in one direction
detract from the other function. This is not the case if the jobs are complements.
(b) Incentive payments related to effort and output to the agent increase, if the
principals act together in a cooperative or collusive manner. Thus, incentives to
the agent to exert optimal effort become stronger. This can be demonstrated by
summing (1) and (2) and then jointly maximising for x. In the resultant
expression for w in (4), the term 2 will vanish.





(c) Equation (4) states that incentive payments to a multi-task agent decline as the
number of principals, stakeholders or masters increases, as the magnitude of the
term 2 in the denominator of (4) rises with the number of principals.
There are at least two clear policy implications here. One is that the donors should try to
make the various efforts that they jointly require of a recipient government more
‘complementary’. In other words, they should go together. The second is that principals
should cooperate more with one another. Murshed and Sen (1995) analyse a common-
agency problem, in the context of adverse selection, when the donors or principals are
also better off when they cooperate. An additional policy implication, but one that is not
explicitly analysed above, is better design and quality of the recipient’s effort level (e).2
These would require institutional capacity building in areas such as superior auditing,
enforcement and legal frameworks.
3 Economic policies and political processes
Aid effectiveness has been said to depend on the presence of a ‘good’ policy framework
(Burnside and Dollar 2000). Tax policies are a crucial element of overall economic
policy. Donors, particularly bilateral institutions, are interested in a sound overall fiscal
policy for two reasons. First, because the domestic tax base has to be eventually
mobilized for the provision of public goods. Secondly, moving towards fiscal balance
(tax revenues matching government expenditure) is an important part of achieving
macroeconomic balance.
In this section I will present the manner in which economic policies could be formulated
out of a variety of political processes. Specifically, I will be concerned with tax policies.
The donor community will be interested in these so as to: (a) gauge potential aid
effectiveness, and (b) so as to ultimately influence the political processes that underlie
economic policymaking. The first model is to do with a median voter outcome, the
2 That is by reducing the variance of fluctuating effort levels that are subject to some random shocks.4
second is associated with competitive lobbying, and the third involves a mixed system,
partially driven by altruism as well as political contributions. The analysis follows
Helpman (1997), whose model is concerned with the formulation of trade policies.
3.1 Direct democracy and median voter outcomes
Here we have the example of a democracy where the median voter’s preferences
determine the policy outcome. The issue at stake is the imposition of a commodity tax
that provides revenues to be spent on public good provision (modelled as a lump-sum
transfer back to the public). But it also lowers the profit income or rents from a factor of
production owned by individuals in the taxed sector. The former entails a benefit and
the latter a cost. The typical individual’s indirect utility function takes the form:
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where U stands for utility and ￿ indicates the tax rate. M is the demand function for the
good(s) that are taxed as a function of tax rates, and ￿M is the tax revenue that is
redistributed back to the public in a lump-sum fashion. P indicates the profit or rent
income from the ownership of factors in sector (i); weighted by ￿, the individual (j’s)
share in the ownership of that factor. This income declines as ￿ is imposed. S is the
consumers surplus’ as a function of the tax. The first term on the right-hand side of (6)
represents revenues redistributed back to the public. The second term stands for factor
income, which is adversely affected after the tax is imposed. The last term indicates the
manner in which consumer’s surplus is related to the tax. Differentiating (6) with
respect to ￿ and setting it equal to zero for an optimum, we find:
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The superscript m in ￿ above indicates the median voter’s share in the assets adversely
affected by the tax in sector i. The equilibrium tax is declining in the median voter’s
share of the asset that is taxed, as well as the negative effect of the tax on his sector
specific factor income (X). Conversely a low median voter share in the taxed asset will
produce a higher tax rate. Also, the smaller is the absolute price (tax) elasticity of
demand for the taxed good (M'), the higher is the tax, akin to the Ramsey rule. The
standard Ramsey rule is associated with ￿ =0a n dXi = 1 in (7).5
In democracies where the median voter determines tax policies, outside donors will
need to be aware of these preferences. Taxes will have to be on those goods where
median voter ownership (￿) is low, and where there income (X) is not greatly affected
by the tax. In most developing countries that are democracies the median voter is
relatively poor, and will not be against a tax being imposed as long as he shares in the
benefits emanating from the tax. Moreover, the ownership of assets in sectors that are
adversely affected by taxes tends to be highly concentrated, putting them outside the
median-voter range. But as stated in Olsen (1965), these individuals may be better at
organizing, and solving collective action problems such as free riding. They might even
form influential lobbies, and it is to this that we now turn.
3.2 Lobbying and taxation
In this sub-section I model the non-cooperative Nash game between two groups
lobbying the government for opposing outcomes. One group favours the tax, the other is
opposed to it. Lobbying entails expenditures. I assume that each group has solved its
intra-group collective action problem. Let us say that a fraction ‘a’ of society is opposed
to the tax, and another group, ‘1–a’ is in favour. Together they make up the whole of
society, an unrealistic assumption that I shall adopt for the sake of algebraic tractability.
Take the example of the group opposed to the tax. Its welfare is given by:
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where the terms inside the square brackets represent the group’s share in revenues and
consumers surplus. Differentiating the above with respect to tax rates and using the
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Equation (9) is the marginal benefit from the tax, which will be negative if Xi is large
and negative.
The welfare of the other group favouring the tax and numbering 1– a is:
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Here there is no loss associated with the ownership of any taxed assets or factors.














The marginal benefit of the tax to this group is positive, for negative Xi.
Each group will maximize its welfare by incurring expenditures in lobbying (C)g i v e n
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The equilibrium tax rate arising out of the above political process is:
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where bi =– Ti
a/Ti
1–a > 0. This is the ratio of the marginal rates of substitution between
the lobbying expenditures of the two opposing groups. If bi > 1 then the marginal
expenditure by the anti-tax lobby is more effective.3 This could easily be the case if the
anti-tax lobby is smaller and more effective.
The implications for donors is that aid might directly or indirectly affect the parameter
b, so as to bring about the desired result from the donor perspective. This would only
work in a multiple donor setting if all donor groups had similar objectives.
3.3 Altruism and influence
Here I consider a government or policymaker that combines social welfare and the
influence of political contributions. Aggregate welfare (or welfare per-capita) enters
into the government’s policy function. So do contributions. To keep the analysis simple,
there is only one group making political contributions, see Helpman (1997) for other
permutations and complications. Let the government or policymaker’s objective
function (G) take the following form:
cW R G + = (14)
where R indicates political contributions. W indicates national or per-capita welfare. The
parameter c represents the trade-off, or the marginal rate of substitution, between
national welfare and contributions. The higher is c the greater the weight placed by the
government on national welfare. Thus c is a benevolence or altruism measure.
As far as the lobbying group is concerned its welfare (Wi) can be construed as:
[] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i i i i S M a P W t t t t t + + = (15)
again the parameter a, measures the size of the group. The lobby group will have to
satisfy the participation constraint of the government. In other words, its contributions
must at least match the government’s utility without the policy advocated by the group,
and contributions should be such that they induce a change. The lobby group will
maximize Wi(￿)–Ri. The equilibrium tax rate will be derived from the following
function:
) ( ) ( t t cW Wi + (16)
3 If bi = 1, then the two lobbies cancel out their respective influences.7
This will lead to:
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Note that the tax rate is a declining function of the concentration in the ownership of the
specific factor adversely affected by the tax, and the associated negative output effect on
factor owners. Also the higher is the level of altruism the greater is the tax (if the tax
raises national welfare).
As far as foreign aid donors are concerned there is scope to influence the government’s
altruism parameter, c, via the aid leverage mechanism.
4 Summary
In the preceding two sections I have considered two alternative scenarios relevant to aid
conditionality and fiscal policy. Two sets of broad policy recommendations emerge out
of the analysis:
(1) In a setting of a principal-agent relationship between donors and a recipient with
multiple tasks, donors or principals are better off: (i) colluding with one another;
(ii) designing the agent’s various efforts so as to make them more
complementary; and, (iii) and improving the quality of the agent’s efforts via
institutional capacity building.
(2) In the context of endogenous domestic policy formation in recipient countries:
(i) median voter preferences need to be taken into account in direct democracies;
(ii) the policy effectiveness of lobbies have to be recognized and influenced;
and, (iii) the government’s ‘welfarist’ or altruistic motivations need to be worked
on. In most societies the last two are more important, due to the fact that the few
(rich and powerful) are far better at collectively organizing around their interests.8
References
Burnside, Craig and David Dollar (2000) ‘Aid, Policies and Growth’, American
Economic Review, 90, 847-68.
Dixit, Avinash K. (1999) ‘Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-
Developed Countries’, unpublished manuscript, Princeton University.
Helpman, Elhanan (1997) ‘Politics and Trade Policy’ in D. M. Kneps and K. F. Wallis
(eds), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications,N e w
York: Cambridge University Press, 19-45.
Holmström, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991) ‘Multi-task Principal Agent Analysis’,
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 24-51.
Hopkins, Raymond F. (2000) ‘The Political Economy of Foreign Aid’ in F. Tarp and
P. Hjerthom (eds), Foreign Aid and Development, London: Routledge, 423-49.
Murshed, S. Mansoob and Somnath Sen (1995) ‘Aid Conditionality and Military
Expenditure Reduction in Developing Countries: Models of Asymmetric
Information’, Economic Journal, 105, 498-509.
Olsen, Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
Svensson, Jakob (2000) ‘Foreign Aid and Rent Seeking’, Journal of International
Economics, 51, 437-61.
Tirole, Jean (1994) ‘The Internal Organization of Government’, Oxford Economic
Papers, 46, 1-29.
Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They
Do It, New York: Basic Books.